
Understanding, the essay says, is in a wide sense the power of thought as against sensibility, and in a narrower sense a higher power of knowing, set apart from reason or mind in general: a capacity that works by inference rather than by a direct intuition. After medieval philosophy, in which understanding had been treated as a copy of archetypes formed by God’s intuitive intellect, a new foundation was needed. In 1690, John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, set out four books: a rejection of innate principles; ideas, simple and complex, as the direct object of understanding, formed from experience; language as an outward sign of ideas; and knowledge as perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas, with intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive kinds, and with judgment that does not go beyond probability.
Hume, a Scottish historian, economist, and philosopher, and in this account an eighteenth-century British empiricist, was deeply marked by Locke. Empiricism here means placing sense and experience above reason in human knowing. Knowledge, Hume held, is not a priori — not a reason that exists before experience — but is acquired after the fact. Reason and thought have an unlimited freedom, yet they are limited by sense and experience: a baby left on a mountain cannot learn a language or the customs of a life.
The essay quotes a 1996 Korean edition of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: the last standard by which we decide arguments always comes from experience and observation; a being can be shown only by arguments from its cause or its effect, and those arguments rest wholly on experience; only experience lets us infer the existence of one object from another. Perceptions are divided, as in Locke, into impressions and ideas, by a difference of vividness.
An impression is more vivid: seeing a cup on a desk gives an impression of the cup; later, when the cup is no longer seen, one may call up its shape and use — an idea. All thought is a bundle of ideas, and a sensation must come first. A plastic cup is the idea of plastic joined to the idea of a cup. A necessary connection — a knife cuts a hand, and blood follows — is not taken from a single case. It is accepted as knowledge only after repeated experience.
What we feel mentally as a connection, the essay cites Hume as saying, is an impression or a sentiment from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection; events are contiguous rather than bound in the object’s nature, and it is not rational inference that leads us to assume that the past resembles the future. It is custom. Without custom, one remains ignorant of anything beyond sense or memory. Knowledge of an object, in this summary, is no more than a belief based on habit; when a person is sure of a judgment, that certainty cannot rise above what we commonly call probability.
The sceptical view, the essay says, is not nihilism. Hume doubts in order to look for genuine knowledge. Anything that includes neither abstract reasoning about quantity or number, nor experimental reasoning about matters of existence, is treated as sophistry and illusion. Locke and Hume both put experience and sense first. They differ, in this reading, over natural law: Locke held that humans are not born with reason or a moral capacity and should conform to a natural law given to them, a state of living freely under no one’s command; Hume held that only experience gives authority to human testimony, and that the systems of a society are created by experience and need.
The significance drawn here is that feeling is brought back into ethics, that emotion is shown to work in knowing and in morals, and that moral thought is turned from rational speculation toward the practical field. Later, the essay notes, a claim to establish the subject would arise with Kant. This page stays with that 1690 debt, with those distinctions, and with that sceptical view.
Understanding, the essay says, is in a wide sense the power of thought as against sensibility, and in a narrower sense a higher power of knowing that works by inference. In 1690, Locke’s Essay set out a rejection of innate principles, ideas formed from experience, language as a sign of ideas, and knowledge as perceiving the agreement of ideas, with judgment that does not go beyond probability. Hume, a Scottish historian, economist, and philosopher, and here an eighteenth-century British empiricist, was deeply marked by that book.
Knowledge, he held, is acquired after the fact, not by a reason that exists before experience. Reason has an unlimited freedom, yet it is limited by sense: a baby left on a mountain cannot learn a language or the customs of a life. The essay quotes a 1996 Korean edition of the Enquiry: the last standard of argument always comes from experience and observation, and only experience lets us infer one object from another.
Perceptions are divided, by vividness, into impressions and ideas. Seeing a cup gives an impression; later one may call up its shape as an idea. A necessary connection — a knife cuts, and blood follows — is accepted only after repeated experience. It is custom, not rational inference, that leads us to assume that the past resembles the future. Knowledge of an object, in this summary, is no more than a belief based on habit, and certainty cannot rise above probability.
The sceptical view is not nihilism; Hume doubts in order to look for genuine knowledge. Locke and Hume both put experience first; they differ, in this reading, over natural law, which Locke treats as given and Hume treats as made by experience and need. Feeling is brought back into ethics, and moral thought is turned toward the practical field. This page stays with that 1690 debt and with that sceptical view. The same Korean report, at fuller length, is on CampusDown.
Last updated: 14 November 2026
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Not by a reason that exists before experience, but after the fact, through sense and experience. A baby left on a mountain cannot learn a language or the customs of a life.
They are divided by vividness. Seeing a cup gives a more vivid impression; later one may call up its shape as an idea. All thought is a bundle of ideas, and a sensation must come first.
No. Hume doubts in order to look for genuine knowledge. Certainty, in this account, cannot rise above what we commonly call probability.