
The notes follow Kim Cheol-ho from a 1993 ginseng business that failed in the 1997 crisis, through hotteok sales and a cooking academy, to a first Bonjuk shop in September 2002. A wellbeing turn in the early 2000s and a 2004 franchise law sit in the background. Instant porridge’s “60 percent or more” at Dongwon F&B, and Bonjuk’s “about 85 percent” of specialist shops, stay in the notes’ window.
In the early 2000s, the notes say, interest in wellbeing rose sharply, and a 2004 law on the promotion of the franchise industry helped Korean-food chains stand out. Porridge, a traditional food, gained value as a product. The Korean porridge market, in this telling, splits into instant porridge and specialist shops. Instant porridge is led by Dongwon F&B, with a share of 60 percent or more; among specialist shops, Bonjuk holds about 85 percent. Those figures, and a later line about some 1,300 franchise stores, are the notes’ claims in that window, and are not rewritten as 2026 official totals.
The founder, Kim Cheol-ho, had made and sold ginseng goods since 1993 through Woo Shin HM and Woo Shin Home Shopping. In the 1997 foreign-exchange crisis, the notes say, both went bankrupt. He tried to avoid the worst, but daily payment notices were more than he could meet. He emptied every account, spent some four months clearing the debt, and was left with nothing. The comfort of having kept his conscience did not feed a family. Wandering the streets for work, he found hope in a foodservice book lying in the corner of a room.
Always interested in food, he registered at an academy whose monthly fee was 300,000 won, and offset the fee by doing the school’s clerical work. By day he sat in cooking class; at night he sold hotteok to live. About a year later, with invested capital, he founded Matkkal Consulting, an academy that advised people who wanted to open restaurants and taught exact recipes. Kim did the consulting; his wife, Choi Bok-i, worked with him on measuring and standardizing the methods. The firm had been set up entirely with other people’s money. As it became more stable, the investor, Lee Sang-hwa, stepped into the management, conflict followed, and after three years Kim left. The experience of many food franchises, the notes say, is what he later built on.
He was sure a specialist porridge shop would work, even after would-be founders had turned the idea down more than once. Large firms, he reasoned, would find it hard to enter a small, specialized trade: cooking porridge is fussy, customers want it made to taste and on time, and a large investment is hard to recover. After a market survey and six months spent designing a recipe — water, weights, seasonings, hygiene, and a wider menu — he finished thirteen first dishes: seven nourishing porridges and six traditional ones. Against advice to decorate like a traditional teahouse, he aimed at women in their twenties and thirties, with leather sofas and classical music. A shop of about ten pyeong still had an auxiliary kitchen, kept for hygiene and a consistent idea, even though some said it would hurt sales.
The first Bonjuk shop opened in September 2002. Early on, few people came in: porridge was not yet seen as a full meal. He served a full 900 millilitres so that it could be taken as one. Regulars appeared, and when he needed to be known he handed out flyers at Hyehwa station in the morning rush. The leaflets began to work, the notes say, first among nurses at Seoul National University Hospital, and the range of customers widened. The same Korean report, at fuller length, is on CampusDown.
Last updated: 14 November 2026
In September 2002, after six months spent settling a recipe. The first menus were thirteen: seven nourishing porridges and six traditional ones.
Woo Shin HM and Woo Shin Home Shopping, which had made ginseng products since 1993, went bankrupt in the foreign-exchange crisis. He spent some four months clearing debts, the notes say, and was left with nothing.
Dongwon F&B holds “60 percent or more” of instant porridge, and Bonjuk “about 85 percent” of specialist porridge shops. Those shares are the notes’ claims in that window, not later official totals. A line about some 1,300 franchise stores is treated the same way.
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