— Overview
The essay, as the Korean page presents it, asks how aesthetic feeling and judgement, in Schiller, may be read as the moralisation of a human being, and how his view of the whole person might be used in education today. Beauty, on this account, is not confined to a harmonious relation among the judging subject’s being without a concept, a disinterested stance, and the faculties of cognition; the writer wants to show it as freedom appearing in a phenomenon. The background of Schiller’s theory is to be understood so that his concepts can be grasped more deeply, including how his view of the whole person agrees with, and differs from, earlier views, and what kinds of impulse he named, and how those impulses might be used in pedagogy. Aesthetic experience, the argument runs, does not stop at preceding the practice of morality in a Kantian sense; it goes, to some degree, beyond it, as a moral education, and as an experience that forms the whole person.
Among the impulses, the page names the play-impulse, and ties it to the forming of the whole person, to the living-through of an aesthetic state, and to the relation between aesthetic freedom and a moral state, and between a practical culture and aesthetic education. Today’s society, the writer says, puts a strong weight on whole-person education: not an education tilted only toward knowledge or skill, but an activity that develops a person’s own qualities and potential into a harmonious human being. That aim, the essay holds, is not only a fashion in education; it reflects a social fact and a thought of the time, because a rapidly changing technical and scientific society needs wholeness as a value. Shop chrome around the essay is left unused; no author beyond Schiller is named in the dumped core.
— Contents and key concepts
Feeling, judgement, and a freedom that appears
The essay, as the Korean page presents it, takes Schiller’s aesthetic view as its centre, and asks in what sense aesthetic feeling and judgement may be read as the moralisation of a human being. It then asks how Schiller’s view of the whole person might be applied in education today. Shop sentences around the essay — a reader’s note about marking a passage and reading it again — are left unused.
In order to do that work, the writer says, beauty is not to be confined to a harmonious relation among the judging subject’s being without a concept, a disinterested stance, and the faculties of cognition. The aim is to show beauty as freedom appearing in a phenomenon. The background against which Schiller’s theory arose is to be understood so that his concepts can be grasped more deeply: how his view of the whole person agrees with, and differs from, earlier views; what kinds of impulse he named; and how those impulses might be used from a pedagogical point of view.
A play-impulse, and a moral education that does not stop at Kant
Among the impulses, the page names the play-impulse. It is tied, in the headings the essay uses, to the concept of the whole person, to the forming of that person, to the living-through of an aesthetic state, and to the relation between the whole person and a moral state, between aesthetic freedom and a moral state, and between a practical culture and aesthetic education. Other impulse-names are not filled in the dumped core, and are not added here.
The claim the writer wants to reach is this: aesthetic experience does not stop at preceding the practice of morality in a Kantian sense. It goes, to some degree, beyond it, as a moral education, and as an experience that forms the whole person.
A whole-person education in a society that changes overnight
Today’s society, the essay says, puts a strong weight on whole-person education. That education is not one tilted only toward knowledge or skill. It is an activity that develops a person’s own qualities and potential, so that they grow into a harmonious human being — a more complex and ideal person, whose particularity and temperament are developed in a positive way. The aim, the writer says, is the whole person.
An aim of that kind is not treated as only a fashion in education. It is read as the result of a social fact and of a thought of the time. Education, whatever its form and content, is finally aimed at a desirable human being, so the image of a person a society wants can become the content, or the purpose, of education. That the whole person has become a direction of education today is, for the writer, because wholeness is a value a society now needs. Technology and science have advanced, and a modern society changes, the essay says, from one day to the next, faster and more widely than a traditional society ever did. The same Korean report, at fuller length, is on CampusDown.
Sources
- Korean presentation of a paper on Schiller’s theory of aesthetic education and its possible use today, including beauty as freedom appearing in a phenomenon, the play-impulse, and a whole-person education.
- Schiller’s relation to a Kantian account of morality, as the essay states that argument.
- No separate modern author is named in the dumped core; shop chrome around the essay is unused.
Last updated: 14 November 2026
Frequently asked questions
What does the essay take beauty to be, in Schiller?
Not only a harmonious relation among the judging subject’s being without a concept, a disinterested stance, and the faculties of cognition. The writer wants to show beauty as freedom appearing in a phenomenon. Aesthetic feeling and judgement are then read as having a part in the moralisation of a human being.
What is the play-impulse, as this page uses it?
Among the kinds of impulse Schiller named, the essay explicitly names the play-impulse, and ties it to the concept of the whole person, to the forming of that person, to the living-through of an aesthetic state, and to the relation between aesthetic freedom and a moral state, and between a practical culture and aesthetic education. Other impulse-names are not filled in the dumped core, and are not added here.
How does the writer connect this to education today?
Aesthetic experience, the argument runs, does not stop at preceding the practice of morality in a Kantian sense; it goes, to some degree, beyond it, as a moral education, and as an experience that forms the whole person. Today’s society, the essay says, puts a strong weight on whole-person education: not an education tilted only toward knowledge or skill, but one that develops a person’s own qualities and potential into a harmonious human being, a more complex and ideal person. That aim is treated as a reflection of a social fact and a thought of the time, because a society changed quickly by technology and science needs wholeness as a value, and because education, whatever its form, is finally aimed at a desirable human being.
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