
The notes follow the 2016 KBO case as it was written then: who was named, how it differed from 2012, and what the writer asked of the league and the clubs, without recasting those facts as a later official total.
Professional baseball, the notes write, is loved among the country’s four major sports, and is thought of as a national game. In 2016, match-fixing happened again. If such corruption and scandal continue, they say, crowds will naturally lose the hope of seeing a fair contest.
They set the 2016 case against 2012. That earlier fixing, in their account, was one in which players fell to a broker’s temptation. This time, a player approached the broker first, proposed the fix, and asked for payment — a different point, they say, for discussion. The problem, they add, is not only that a particular player fixed games again, but the view of fixing among the players themselves. They also recall that two LG players were permanently banned over the 2012 case.
On 21 July 2016, as the notes date it, NC Dinos pitcher Lee Tae-yang was indicted without detention, accused of fixing games for money. Moon Woo-ram, an outfielder who had been with the Nexen Heroes and had then enlisted, was sent to the military prosecutors on the same charge. Lee, they write, had played for the national side at a world youth baseball championship. He threw balls as agreed with a broker beforehand, and was to receive ₩20 million in cash — a date, a method, and a sum kept as the notes record them for that year, not as a later official total.
In a game that should decide a win and a loss by fair play, they write, a professional set aside his duty to the match and to the club, and played for money — a fact they call shocking. Fixing, they add, is a dark trade between broker and player, hard to expose and hard to catch. Behind such cases there is always, in their account, an illegal online gambling site, and because such sites are many, more baseball fixing may not yet have come to light.
The writer wants legal and institutional measures in place quickly, so that cases of this kind do not happen again, and wants stiff penalties for players who take part — including a permanent ban from the park if the offence is repeated. Clubs, they say, also share some fault: they have not cared for their players well enough, nor paid them in a way that would make temptation harder, and, eager for results, have failed to spot and filter those who might cause trouble.
The KBO, they write, had after the case four years earlier announced zero tolerance for those who took part, rewards and lighter penalties for those who reported, undercover inspection, and stronger prevention education and self-cleaning. Whether those steps were really carried out over the four years that followed, the notes doubt, and whether they had any effect on the players is not shown. Seeing the league rush to respond only when a case breaks, the writer does not trust it. Education to keep brokers from reaching players, they add, has not been properly set out either. The same Korean report, at fuller length, is on CampusDown.
Last updated: 15 November 2026
On 21 July 2016, NC Dinos pitcher Lee Tae-yang was indicted without detention, accused of fixing games for money. Moon Woo-ram, an outfielder who had been with the Nexen Heroes and had then enlisted, was sent to the military prosecutors on the same charge. Lee, the notes say, was a former national youth-championship player; he threw balls as agreed with a broker beforehand, and was to receive ₩20 million in cash — figures and a date kept in that 2016 window.
The 2012 fixing, they write, was a case in which players fell to a broker’s temptation. In 2016, the player approached the broker first, proposed the fix, and asked for payment. They also recall that two LG players were permanently banned over the 2012 case.
The writer wants legal and institutional measures in place quickly, and stiff penalties — including a permanent ban from the park if the offence is repeated. Clubs, they say, share some fault for poor care of players and for chasing results without spotting risk. The KBO, after the case four years earlier, had announced zero tolerance, rewards for those who reported, undercover inspection, and stronger prevention education; the notes doubt whether those steps were really carried out, or had any effect, over the four years that followed.
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